Missed Opportunities: How the Courts Struck Down the Florida School Voucher Program by Manta, Irina D
Saint Louis University Law Journal 
Volume 51 
Number 1 Fall 2006 Article 8 
2006 
Missed Opportunities: How the Courts Struck Down the Florida 
School Voucher Program 
Irina D. Manta 
irina.manta@aya.yale.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Irina D. Manta, Missed Opportunities: How the Courts Struck Down the Florida School Voucher Program, 
51 St. Louis U. L.J. (2006). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol51/iss1/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more 
information, please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
185 
MISSED OPPORTUNITIES: HOW THE COURTS STRUCK DOWN 
THE FLORIDA SCHOOL VOUCHER PROGRAM 
IRINA D. MANTA* 
INTRODUCTION 
The future of American school voucher programs appeared promising after 
the Supreme Court held in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris1 that a program enabling 
parents to use vouchers to send their children to parochial schools did not 
violate the federal Establishment Clause.  The debate over vouchers has always 
been inextricably bound with the question about the proper relationship 
between religion and the state.  The fact that over 85% of private primary and 
secondary schools possess a religious affiliation makes the implementation of a 
voucher program limited to secular institutions extremely difficult.2  Voucher 
opponents did not let Zelman stop them, however, and they turned the debate 
into one over the interpretation of various related aspects of state 
constitutions.3 
The recently completed litigation over the Opportunity Scholarships 
Program (OSP) in Florida is highly significant in that context.  In 1999, Florida 
was the first state to adopt a statewide voucher program.4  The premise of the 
OSP appeared simple: children who attended schools that received a grade of 
 
* Adjunct Professor, University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen School of Law; 
Law Clerk to the Honorable Morris S. Arnold, United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.  
J.D., Yale Law School (2006); B.A., Yale University (2003).  I would like to thank Will Baude 
for the helpful conversations we had on the subject of this piece, Professor John Simon whose 
course “Education and the Law” inspired me to write about this topic, Clint Bolick from the 
Institute for Justice for his comments, Jacob Loshin for information on state Blaine Amendments, 
Jennifer Peresie for her suggestions, and Matthew Craig for his editorial assistance. 
 1. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 2. Toby J. Heytens, School Choice and State Constitutions, 86 VA. L. REV. 117, 121 (2000) 
(citation omitted). 
 3. After the Supreme Court issued Zelman, both of the nation’s largest teachers’ unions, the 
National Education Association and the American Foundation of Teachers, declared that they 
would oppose vouchers through all possible means.  Public education’s administrators and school 
board groups joined these unions in battling school vouchers.  See Richard Fossey & Robert 
LeBlanc, Vouchers For Sectarian Schools After Zelman: Will the First Circuit Expose Anti-
Catholic Bigotry in the Massachusetts Constitution?, 193 ED. LAW REP. 343, 349 (2005). 
 4. Heytens, supra note 2, at 119. 
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“F” from the State two out of the previous four years would obtain the right to 
transfer to better public schools or to private schools that their parents chose, 
and public monies would help to cover tuition.5  The program was under attack 
by state and national teachers’ unions and others from its inception;6 in fact, 
various groups filed lawsuits7 to stop the OSP the day after Florida created it.8  
The plaintiffs asserted that the OSP violated two provisions of the state 
constitution: Article IX, Section 1,9 which establishes an obligation on Florida 
to provide a system of public schools, and Article I, Section 3,10 which 
represents the clause prohibiting aid to religious institutions (also referred to as 
a “Blaine Amendment”).11  The plaintiffs further initially sued under the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.12  While they dropped this last claim after the Supreme Court 
issued Zelman, they continued to litigate the claims arising under the state 
constitution.13  This case would eventually become the first Blaine Amendment 
litigation before a state supreme court in the aftermath of Locke v. Davey,14 and 
both school voucher advocates and opponents nationwide would closely watch 
 
 5. Institute for Justice, Safeguarding Educational Freedom: Latest Legal Showdown for 
School Choice Heads to Florida Supreme Court, http://www.ij.org/schoolchoice/florida/ 
backgrounder.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2006). 
 6. See Institute for Justice, supra note 5. 
 7. The Florida Education Association, the Florida branch of the American Federation of 
Teachers, and the Florida PTA all joined in the suit.  See Fossey & LeBlanc, supra note 3, at 352.  
The ACLU, NAACP, and People For the American Way were also involved in the litigation, 
claiming that the OSP was unconstitutional.  See also Heytens, supra note 2, at 121. 
 8. Heytens, supra note 2, at 121. 
 9. Id.  Article IX, section 1 of the Florida Constitution provides: 
Adequate provision shall be made by law for a uniform system of free public schools and for the 
establishment, maintenance and operation of institutions of higher learning and other public 
education programs that the needs of the people may require. 
FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.  This provision is referred to as the “uniformity clause.” 
 10. The section reads: 
Religious Freedom.—There shall be no law respecting the establishment of religion or 
prohibiting or penalizing the free exercise thereof.  Religious freedom shall not justify 
practices inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety.  No revenue of the state or any 
political subdivision or agency thereof shall ever be taken from the public treasury 
directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid of any 
sectarian institution. 
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3.  This provision is referred to as the “no-aid provision.” 
 11. Heytens, supra note 2, at 118 n.4. 
 12. Institute for Justice, supra note 5.  The First Amendment famously provides that 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”  U.S. CONST. 
amend. I. 
 13. Institute for Justice, supra note 5. 
 14. 540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
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it develop.15  Significant disappointment ensued on the part of advocates when 
the Florida Supreme Court decided the case, Bush v. Holmes,16 on the grounds 
of Article IX, Section 1 of the state constitution and failed to address the 
Blaine Amendment, which the Florida District Court of Appeal had used as 
grounds to strike down the OSP.17  Most notably, this move to focus on the 
interpretation of state law alone ensured that the United States Supreme Court 
would not grant certiorari and that the OSP would definitely fall.18 
This paper argues that both the Florida Supreme Court and the District 
Court of Appeal took incorrect interpretations of the state constitution, and that 
the OSP should be allowed to continue.  The District Court of Appeal, through 
a tortured reading of the history of Florida’s no-aid provision, failed to rule 
that the provision violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of 
the United States Constitution by discriminating against religious schools.  
Alternatively, the court could have held that the no-aid provision does not 
apply to religious schools, and thus avoided a constitutional problem.  
Additionally, this paper will explain why the Florida Supreme Court 
misinterpreted the “uniformity clause” of the state constitution.  Because other 
states may turn to the Florida decision for guidance, it is imperative to analyze 
and present its flaws before children nationwide lose their educational 
opportunities.  Part I of this piece presents the background behind the 
originally proposed federal Blaine Amendment and describes how its downfall 
led a significant number of states to add Blaine-type no-aid sections to their 
constitutions.  Part II analyzes the decision of the Florida District Court of 
Appeal to strike down the OSP under Florida’s no-aid provision and 
establishes that the court should have either struck down the provision or held 
that it does not apply to the OSP.  Part III examines the Florida Supreme 
Court’s decision to uphold the decision below on a flawed understanding of 
separate state constitutional grounds and cautions against the consequences 
that this mistake could engender in other states. 
I.  THE ORIGINAL BLAINE AMENDMENT AND ITS PROGENY 
To make a determination as to the correctness of the Florida District Court 
of Appeal’s decision to uphold the State’s Blaine Amendment, it is useful to 
begin by examining the contexts in which Blaine Amendments generally and 
Florida’s version in particular arose.  The originally proposed federal Blaine 
Amendment took its name from Representative James Blaine of Maine, who 
 
 15. See Institute for Justice, supra note 5. 
 16. Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 398 (Fla. 2006). 
 17. See Institute for Justice, supra note 5. 
 18. The principle was established long ago that only questions of federal law are open to 
Supreme Court review, while state court judgments are final on questions of state law.  Murdock 
v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 635–36 (1874). 
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sought to introduce a constitutional provision in 1875 that would prohibit the 
transfer of any public funds to schools run by religious sects.19  Initially, 
Protestants had dominated the education that took place in the common schools 
of the nation, but as the number of Catholics in America grew, so did 
Catholics’ potential power to control parts of the educational system.20  
Catholics also attempted to separately develop their own educational systems 
and began to lobby state legislatures for public funds to do so.21  President 
Grant sought to capitalize on the existing anti-Catholic sentiment by 
vehemently opposing the funding of such “sectarian” schools.22  It is that 
background that fueled Representative Blaine’s proposal.23 
The Amendment did not receive the needed two-thirds majority in 
Congress to pass.24  Nonetheless, “Blaine would live in perpetuity as a symbol 
of the irony and hypocrisy that characterized much future debate: employing 
constitutional language, invoking patriotic images, and repeatedly appealing to 
individual rights as a distraction from the real business at hand—undermining 
the viability of schools run by religious minorities.”25  While never becoming 
federal law, the proposal inspired a number of states to adopt individual 
versions thereof, if they had not already incorporated similar provisions 
previously.26  By 1876, fourteen states had enacted Blaine-type legislation, and 
by 1890 twenty-nine states had adopted the equivalent of Blaine Amendments 
as part of their constitutions.27  These Amendments have not been identical; 
they range in the number of restrictions they impose on the transfer of public 
funds to religious schools.28 
One scholar places the Florida no-aid provision into the category of the 
most restrictive type of Blaine Amendment, which he defines as the kind that 
goes “far beyond the prohibition of direct aid to schools by preventing indirect 
aid as well.”29  Florida enacted the provision in 1885, and there is no record 
from the constitutional convention in which it was adopted.30  The enactment, 
 
 19. See, e.g., Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine 
Amendments: Origins, Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 551, 
556 (2003) (citations omitted). 
 20. Id. at 558–63. 
 21. See Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine’s Wake: School Choice, the First Amendment, and State 
Constitutional Law, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 657, 669 (1998). 
 22. DeForrest, supra note 19, at 565–66. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 573. 
 25. Viteritti, supra note 21, at 671. 
 26. DeForrest, supra note 19, at 576. 
 27. Viteritti, supra note 21, at 673. 
 28. See DeForrest, supra note 19, at 576–88 (providing a nationwide overview of the 
restrictiveness of different states’ Blaine Amendments). 
 29. Id. at 587. 
 30. See Bush v. Holmes, 886 So. 2d 340, 348 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
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however, took place during the same time period in which other states were 
adopting Blaine Amendments.31  It is against this charged backdrop that one 
must consider the decision of the Florida District Court of Appeal that struck 
down the OSP based on the State’s prohibition against direct or indirect aid to 
sectarian institutions. 
II.  THE FLORIDA DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL AND THE NO-AID PROVISION 
This Part will address why the District Court of Appeal erred in its refusal 
to either strike down the State’s no-aid provision as unconstitutional under the 
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, or alternatively, construe the provision in a constitutional way by 
determining that it does not apply to the OSP.  The arguments presented here 
will show that Florida’s no-aid provision represents a discriminatory Blaine 
Amendment if interpreted to disallow a program that lets parents use school 
vouchers at either religious or secular institutions of their choice. 
The majority opinion of the District Court of Appeal makes it a point to 
state that “[w]hether the Blaine-era amendments are based on religious bigotry 
is a disputed and controversial issue among historians and legal scholars” and 
that “there is no evidence of religious bigotry relating to Florida’s no-aid 
provision.”32  The court emphasizes, however, that “[e]ven if the no-aid 
provisions were ‘born of bigotry,’ such a history does not render the final 
sentence of article I, section 3, superfluous.”33  The only evidence that the 
court provides to argue that the relationship between the Blaine Amendments 
and anti-Catholic bigotry is indeed a “controversial issue among historians and 
legal scholars,”34 rather than universally accepted consists of a citation to one 
article by Indiana University law student Barclay Thomas Johnson, whose 
limited claim is that the no-aid provision in the Indiana Constitution is unlikely 
to have been the result of such bigotry.35  The scholarship on the history of 
Blaine Amendments is much clearer than the court presents, and the majority 
opinion also completely mischaracterizes the claims in Johnson’s article. 
Scholars are in significant agreement that anti-Catholicism fueled the 
states’ respective Blaine Amendments.  Basing their claim on the work of 
numerous others, Richard Fossey and Robert LeBlanc refer to the 
Amendments as “steeped in a heritage of anti-Catholic bigotry”36 and 
 
 31. Id. at 348–49. 
 32. Id. at 351–52 n.9. 
 33. Id. at 352 (internal citation omitted). 
 34. Id. at 350. 
 35. Barclay Thomas Johnson, Credit Crisis to Education Emergency: The Constitutionality 
of Model Student Voucher Programs Under the Indiana Constitution, 35 IND. L. REV. 173 (2001). 
 36. Fossey & LeBlanc, supra note 3, at 344. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
190 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:185 
emphasize Justice Thomas’ plurality opinion in Mitchell v. Helms37 and the 
scholarship of Joseph Viteritti,38 “perhaps the foremost scholar regarding the 
Blaine Amendments,”39 to that effect.  Finally, the authors provide the 
following summary of the issue: 
[T]he conclusion that [the Blaine Amendments] were driven by the 
Protestant/Catholic divide is unmistakable, despite the fact that none of the 
amendments refer specifically to Roman Catholics or Catholic Schools.  This 
appears to be the scholarly consensus.  It is also supported by the statistics 
regarding private school religious affiliation at the time, the Senate debate over 
the Federal Blaine Amendment, and the breakdown of social and political 
groups that supported and opposed the measure.40 
Viteritti himself does not mince his words, either, when he writes that “Blaine 
amendment provisions, found in more than half the state constitutions, are a 
notable illustration of the kind of inverted logic that has influenced church-
state relations for more than a century.”41  He adds that “[w]hile many strict 
separationists point to the Blaine amendment as a legal mechanism to protect 
religious freedom, an examination of Blaine’s history shows that it was borne 
out of a spirit of religious bigotry and intolerance directed against Catholic 
immigrants during the nineteenth century.”42  In his book Divided by God, law 
and religion scholar Noah Feldman mentions the “[s]ound scholarship 
emphasizing the anti-Catholic history of the Blaine amendment.”43  One 
scholar notes that the enactment of state Blaine Amendments stemmed from “a 
high degree of hostility towards the teaching and practice of the Roman 
Catholic Church, and correspondingly there existed a strong desire to ensure 
that Catholics would be precluded from using the resources of the government 
to support their parochial schools and other religious institutions.”44  Further, 
an amicus brief co-written by Professor Richard Garnett in Locke v. Davey 
states that “the Blaine Amendments were designed to (and still do) impose 
special legal disadvantages on Catholics because their beliefs were feared or 
 
 37. Id. at 351 (citing Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828–29 (2000)) (stating that the 
refusal to aid religious schools had a “shameful pedigree” stemming from anti-Catholic prejudice 
and that the proposed federal Blaine Amendment “arose at a time of pervasive hostility to the 
Catholic Church and to Catholics in general, and it was an open secret that ‘sectarian’ was code 
for ‘Catholic’”). 
 38. Id. (citing Viteritti, supra note 21, at 675). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. (citing Heytens, supra note 2, at 138). 
 41. JOSEPH P. VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY: SCHOOL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND 
CIVIL SOCIETY 17–18 (1999). 
 42. Id. at 18. 
 43. NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA’S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM—AND 
WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT IT 211 (2005). 
 44. DeForrest, supra note 19, at 602. 
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hated by a sufficient majority.”45  The proponents, some of them very 
renowned, of the theory linking the state Blaine Amendments to anti-
Catholicism are thus numerous and speak with a consistent voice. 
Not only would most scholars shudder at the idea that one student article to 
the contrary can suddenly make an established body of legal history 
controversial,46 but Barclay Thomas Johnson’s student article does not even 
make the claims that the Florida District Court of Appeal imputes to it.  The 
court states that “[o]ther commentators argue, however, that anti-Catholic 
bigotry did not play a significant role in the development of Blaine-era no-aid 
provisions in state constitutions” and cites to Johnson’s article.47  In particular, 
the court states that the article “indicat[es] that in 1850, less than six percent of 
Indiana inhabitants were immigrants and fewer still were Catholics” and that 
“[t]he Indiana aid provision was not ‘a remnant of nineteenth century religious 
bigotry promulgated by nativist political leaders who were alarmed by the 
growth of immigrant populations and who had a particular disdain for 
Catholics.’”48  A closer look at Johnson’s piece, however, reveals an entirely 
different picture.  While the author identifies non-discriminatory sources for 
Indiana’s no-aid provision, he states: 
[W]ith respect to Indiana, it must be immediately understood and articulated 
that article I, section 6 [i.e. the State’s no-aid provision] is not a Blaine 
amendment.  Indiana’s 1851 Constitution was enacted nearly a quarter-century 
before then Governor Rutherford B. Hayes of Ohio and Representative James 
G. Blaine began to publicly oppose the use of state funds to support Catholic 
schools in 1875.49 
The court thus uses as evidence the history of a no-aid provision that is 
unrelated and was not in fact the type of provision that numerous states 
adopted in the aftermath of the failed introduction of the federal Blaine 
Amendment.  The Johnson excerpt presented here is found within the same 
page numbers as the one that the court cites,50 so it is quite unlikely that the 
court accidentally misunderstood the article as sending a different message.  
Rather, this indicates potential bad faith on the part of the court in a desperate 
 
 45. Brief of Amici Curiae the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty et al. in Support of 
Respondent at 29, Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (No. 02-1315). 
 46. This could theoretically happen, but it is rarely the case.  Generally speaking, it takes 
more than one article and, as discussed infra, more evidence to call the situation controversial.  
To analogize, the fact that a few historians deny the entire Holocaust or significant aspects thereof 
does not inspire scholars to view the veracity of the Holocaust as controversial. 
 47. Bush v. Holmes, 886 So. 2d 340, 351 n.9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
 48. Id. (citing Johnson, supra note 35, at 200–03). 
 49. Johnson, supra note 35, at 200–01 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
 50. Id. at 200–03; Bush, 886 So. 2d at 351 n.9. 
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attempt to find historical controversy over Blaine Amendments where none 
exists.51 
Even if the court had made the limited claim that there is theoretically such 
a thing as a no-aid provision that is not motivated by discriminatory intent (e.g. 
Indiana’s), the burden of proof rests on the shoulders of voucher opponents if 
there is any disagreement as to the intent behind Florida’s no-aid provision; 
because the default historical assumption is that no-aid provisions that were 
passed in the years after the failed Blaine Amendment stemmed from anti-
Catholic prejudice,52 it is for voucher opponents to bring evidence disproving 
the historical assumption. 
One commentator suggests that even if “Florida’s Blaine Amendment was 
enacted with a discriminatory purpose, the Amendment was probably ‘washed 
clean’ when it was reviewed and changed in 1968.”53  He cites a newspaper 
article as evidence that contains the following passage: 
If there was a taint, it was washed clean when the provision was reaffirmed in 
the Constitution of 1968 with a slight change that made it applicable to “any 
political subdivision or agency” of the state.  The intent, openly debated in the 
Legislature, was to forbid vouchers for religious schools, whether issued by the 
state or by school boards.  This did not single out Catholics, though their 
interest was the oldest.  Legislators voting on the measure had to be aware that 
it could affect schools that were sprouting under the sponsorship of Protestant 
churches as the Supreme Court’s public school desegregation decisions began 
belatedly to take effect.54 
 
 51. Ironically, Johnson explains that even in Indiana’s case the no-aid provision should not 
present an obstacle to a model school voucher program.  Specifically, he states: 
Finally, a model voucher program does not offend the Indiana Constitution because it is 
consistent with the historical purposes behind the changes made in the 1851 Constitution.  
Additionally, where state funds flow to religious institutions from neutral, generally 
applicable programs, the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause is not violated if the 
funds are directed by independent, private decisions of third parties.  In summary, a model 
voucher program in Indiana will survive scrutiny under both the Indiana and United States 
Constitutions. 
Johnson, supra note 35, at 212. 
 52. One source notes the “closeness in time and the similarity to the original Blaine 
Amendment” of the Florida no-aid provision.  J. Scott Slater, Comment, Florida’s “Blaine 
Amendment” and Its Effect on Educational Opportunities, 33 STETSON L. REV. 581, 619 (2004).  
Slater notes that even some school voucher opponents have admitted that the provision “sounds 
like a Blaine [A]mendment—the time line would fit, and the language is similar.”  Id. at 619 
n.304 (citing Jo Becker, Voucher Debate Entwined with a Century-Old Fight, ST. PETERSBURG 
TIMES, July 6, 1999, at 4B, available at http://www.sptimes.com/News/70699/State/ 
Voucher_debate_entwin.shtml). 
 53. Id. at 619. 
 54. Martin Dyckman, History of Religion Has a Place in Schools, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 
July 18, 1999, at 3D. 
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This attractively simple analysis actually misses a number of factors and leads 
to an incorrect result.  First, the burden is on school voucher opponents to 
show that the legislature transformed the intent behind the no-aid provision 
from the discriminatory one of the Blaine era to a neutral one.  In a 
hypothetical case of re-enactment without any sort of legislative history and 
where no significant changes to a provision occur, one would presumably just 
assume that the intent behind the provision remains the same.  In the litigation 
at bar, the legislature only made one small alteration that did not change the 
character of the provision when it added the words “any political subdivision 
or agency.”55  Even if the legislature re-enacted the amendment without 
reference to Catholicism, two issues remain.  The first is that whether the 
legislature explicitly addressed this or not, it is widely known that a great 
number of private schools are Catholic56 and that no voucher program is likely 
to effectively function if these are excluded.  Secondly, if anything, the new 
intent changed from one that discriminated solely against Catholicism to one 
that discriminates against all religions and favors secular institutions, which is 
equally problematic.57 
A closer analysis of this last point must begin with the free exercise test 
that the Supreme Court established in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. 
v. City of Hialeah,58 which requires that any law not facially neutral toward 
religion must be narrowly tailored to fulfill a compelling state interest.59  The 
Florida Government’s brief to the state supreme court60 powerfully argues why 
the District Court of Appeal erred in determining that the no-aid provision as 
applied to the OSP met the Lukumi test, which occurred through a mistaken 
analogy to the program upheld in Locke v. Davey.61  The brief explains: “The 
[Locke] Court went to great lengths to emphasize that a scholarship program 
discriminating against persons pursuing a non-theological major would be a 
different case, as would a case involving a state Blaine Amendment or public 
 
 55. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
 56. “[In 1885], as today, Catholics operated more religious schools than any other 
denomination.”  Jo Becker, Voucher Debate Entwined with a Century-Old Fight, ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES, July 6, 1999, at 4B, available at http://www.sptimes.com/News/70699/ 
State/Voucher_debate_entwin.shtml.  And, as mentioned, 85% of private schools have a religious 
affiliation.  See supra text accompanying note 2. 
 57. One scholar notes: “While Nineteenth Century Blaine provisions targeted specific 
sectarian religions, most modern court opinions interpreting state Blaine amendments, like the 
Witters II decision from Washington State, strike not just at particular faiths, but at all faiths.”  
DeForrest, supra note 19, at 616. 
 58. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 59. Id. at 531–32. 
 60. Initial Brief of Governor John Ellis (Jeb) Bush et al. at 34–39, Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 
2d 392 (Fla. 2006) (Nos. SC04-2323/SC04-2324/SC04-2325), available at http://www.ij.org/ 
pdf_folder/school_choice/florida/gov-bush-doe.pdf. 
 61. 540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
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forum.”62  The Florida Government also emphasizes that “implicit in the 
Supreme Court’s opinion was the assumption that the Washington 
constitutional provision would have violated the Free Exercise Clause if it had 
reflected an animus toward religion.”63  The brief concludes that the no-aid 
provision in this case 
is a far cry from the restriction upheld in Locke and, by singling-out religious 
institutions for exclusion, the Florida constitutional provision as interpreted 
would necessarily reflect animus toward religion.  The very fact that the Court 
in Locke emphasized the limited nature of the Washington restriction strongly 
suggests that it would not uphold a restriction as broad as that imposed by the 
majority’s interpretation of the Florida Constitution.64 
Some express little doubt that the Florida legislature knew perfectly well what 
it was doing with regard to discrimination on the basis of religion when the 
legislature re-enacted the no-aid provision, with one member of the 1968 
Constitutional Revision Commission publicly stating that he and others 
“specifically intended to prohibit vouchers from being used to support any 
religious schools.”65  If the District Court of Appeal believed that this was 
indeed the legislature’s intent behind the re-enacted provision, it should have 
struck down the provision as unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause; 
if it believed the intent was of a different nature,66 it should have held that the 
provision does not apply to the OSP.  As mentioned earlier in this Part, the 
Government’s brief to the Florida Supreme Court shows how this case could 
have been distinguished from Locke v. Davey, respecting that precedent while 
correcting the constitutional violation at bar.  Mark DeForrest argues that a 
state’s Blaine Amendment causes “significant Religion Clause concerns in that 
it singles out religious institutions like schools and hospitals and those who 
benefit from their services from being treated by the state in the same manner 
as similarly situated but secular private entities.”67  He explains: 
 
 62. Initial Brief of Governor, supra note 60, at 35 (citations omitted). 
 63. Id. at 36.  Indeed, the government elaborates that: 
The expressed reason that the Court found no evidence of animus in the Washington 
constitutional clause was that it had been interpreted by the state to permit the use of 
scholarship funds by students “to attend pervasively religious schools, so long as they are 
accredited” and under the scholarship program “students are still eligible to take 
devotional theology courses.” 
Id. 
 64. Id. at 38. 
 65. Becker, supra note 56. 
 66. The dissent in the Florida Supreme Court decision in Holmes suggests that possibility by 
mentioning that “[w]hen the Florida House of Representatives considered language for the 1968 
constitution, it rejected a proposal to add a section to article IX that would have limited the 
Legislature’s use of education funds by preventing any state money from going to sectarian 
schools.”  Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 423 (Fla. 2006) (Bell, J., dissenting). 
 67. DeForrest, supra note 19, at 608. 
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This is particularly true when the differential treatment is based on a person or 
institution’s very status as a religious believer or institution . . .  [and thus,] if 
the government opens up its coffers to provide aid to secular private schools or 
their students, the principle of religious neutrality requires that they should also 
allow religionists and religious schools to participate in such aid programs.68 
Professor Stephen Carter supports this viewpoint and posits that the 
government’s refusal to do this would violate the Constitution given that it 
“would make religious schools more costly and would thus constitute a 
government-created disincentive to use them.”69 
In his dissent in Locke, Justice Scalia argues vividly that even if there is no 
improper discriminatory sentiment motivating legislators, the Supreme Court 
of the United States can strike down as unconstitutional a law for its 
discriminatory effects.70  One of the examples he provides is that when the 
Court deemed 
racial segregation unconstitutional, [it] did not ask whether the State had 
originally adopted the regime, not out of ‘animus’ against blacks, but because 
of a well-meaning but misguided belief that the races would be better off apart.  
It was sufficient to note the current effect of segregation on racial minorities.71 
While Scalia found himself in the minority in the particular case of Locke, 
courts have long accepted the principle derived from Everson v. Board of 
Education of Ewing72 that “when the State withholds [a generally available] 
benefit from some individuals solely on the basis of religion, it violates the 
Free Exercise Clause no less than if it had imposed a special tax.”73  All these 
arguments show effectively why the way the Florida District Court of Appeal 
construed the State’s no-aid provision infringes upon the United States 
Constitution, whether the intent of the legislature was discriminatory at any 
point in time or not. 
The court, however, had another possible solution besides striking down 
the clause: it could have adopted the view that the no-aid provision did not 
 
 68. Id. at 608–09 (footnote omitted). 
 69. Id. at 609 (quoting STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN 
LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 200 (1993)). 
 70. Justice Scalia states that he does not understand “why the legislature’s motive matters” 
and analogizes: “If a State deprives a citizen of trial by jury or passes an ex post facto law, we do 
not pause to investigate whether it was actually trying to accomplish the evil the Constitution 
prohibits.  It is sufficient that the citizen’s rights have been infringed.”  Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 
712, 732 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  It is important to note that while Justice Scalia found 
himself in the minority in Locke, his arguments gain new strength in the much more extreme case 
at bar whose differences from Locke are explained in Part II, supra. 
 71. Id. 
 72. 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (holding that New Jersey could not exclude religious individuals 
from a public welfare program). 
 73. Locke, 540 U.S. at 726–27 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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apply in the context of the OSP.  Arguing in its brief to the Florida Supreme 
Court on behalf of parents who benefited from the program, the Institute for 
Justice74 (IJ) explained that Opportunity Scholarships award aid to families in 
search of better schooling for their children “and because any benefits to 
religious institutions are merely incidental to that goal—as they are in dozens 
of other public welfare programs in Florida that allow religious groups to 
participate—the program is perfectly consistent with the text, intent, and 
historical interpretation of [the no-aid provision].”75  IJ points to the 
inconsistency in applying the no-aid provision to the OSP when the legislature 
had repeatedly enacted other programs that allowed religious institutions to 
provide services without any legal challenge.76  Further, it had to be 
established beyond a reasonable doubt that the no-aid provision applied to the 
OSP, and IJ was able to submit as counter-evidence both the legislature’s 
aforementioned passage of many such programs and the entirely “inconsistent 
interpretation of virtually identical language by courts in other states.”77  The 
Florida Supreme Court, however, declined the invitation to rectify the 
mistaken understanding of the District Court of Appeal.  The Supreme Court 
neither struck down the no-aid provision for violating the United States 
Constitution nor construed it such that it would not apply to the OSP.  Instead, 
it simply chose to evade the issue altogether. 
III.  THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
The Florida Supreme Court states its reasoning for refusing to address 
questions related to the no-aid provision as follows: “Because we determine 
that the OSP is unconstitutional as in violation of article IX, section 1(a) 
[uniformity clause], we find it unnecessary to address whether the OSP is a 
violation of the ‘no aid’ provision in article 1, section 3 of the Constitution, as 
held by the First District.”78  The Court claims that under the principle of 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius,79 the state constitution prohibits the OSP 
because the program interferes with the uniformity clause of the state 
constitution that requires that the education of children “shall be made by law 
 
 74. The Institute for Justice is a public interest law firm based in Arlington, Virginia. 
 75. Initial Brief of Intervenors/Defendants/Appellants Brenda McShane, et al. at 3, Bush v. 
Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006) (Nos. SC04-2323 to SC-4-2325), available at 
http://www.ij.org/pdf_folder/school_choice/florida/FL_SC_filing.pdf. 
 76. Id. at 7.  Specifically the brief of the Institute for Justice reasons as follows: “Of course, 
it would be astonishing to learn that the legislature has been passing—and the people of Florida 
consistently accepting—unconstitutional public welfare programs for decades, particularly under 
the watchful gaze of Appellees and others who share their keen interest in Florida church-state 
relations.”  Id. at 8.  Striking down the OSP thus now also puts other programs at risk.  Id. at 8–9. 
 77. Id. at 12. 
 78. Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 398 (Fla. 2006). 
 79. Id. at 407 (i.e., “the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of another”). 
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for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure and high quality system of free public 
schools.”80  This state constitutional provision does not “establish a ‘floor’ of 
what the state can do to provide for the education of Florida’s children,” the 
Court explains, but rather “mandates that the state’s obligation is to provide for 
the education of Florida’s children, specifies that the manner of fulfilling this 
obligation is by providing a uniform, high quality system of free public 
education, and does not authorize additional equivalent alternatives.”81  The 
conclusion that the Court draws, however, is in no way as clear as the opinion 
in Bush v. Holmes appears to suggest.  For one, a strict application of this 
interpretation could prove absurd and disastrous.  The Court’s claim boils 
down to stating that the requirement to fund public education prohibits the 
State from funding any type of non-public education.  What are the 
implications of this statement, for instance, for public libraries, which receive 
state money and often educate children outside a uniform system of public 
schools?  What about public roads near private schools, which cost the State 
money and enable children to drive to said schools?  One could name a number 
of other examples of state expenditures that educate children: public-
information campaigns, grants to artists, writers, poets, and so on. 
The Florida Supreme Court’s case is further weakened by the fact that it 
appears to base its entire understanding of expressio unius on a quote from a 
statement in the 1927 Weinberger v. Board of Public Instruction82 decision that 
states: “Even though the Constitution does not in terms prohibit the doing of a 
thing in another manner, the fact that it has prescribed the manner in which the 
thing shall be done is itself a prohibition against a different manner of doing 
it.”83  The context of this quotation, however, is crucial to understanding what 
the Court meant in Weinberger and makes the case entirely distinguishable 
from Bush v. Holmes.  In Weinberger, the Court had to examine a clause from 
the Florida Constitution that concerned the issuance of bonds; specifically, the 
constitution “declare[d] that the Legislature may provide for Special Tax 
School Districts to issue bonds for the exclusive use of public free schools 
within any special tax school district”84 under the condition that “[a]ny bonds 
issued hereunder shall become payable within thirty years from the date of 
issuance in annual installments which shall commence not more than three 
years after the date of issue.  Each annual installment shall be not less than 
 
 80. Id. (quoting FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1). 
 81. Id. at 408. 
 82. 112 So. 253 (Fla. 1927). 
 83. Bush, 919 So. 2d at 407 (quoting Weinberger, 112 So. at 256).  The Court also briefly 
refers to S&J Transp., Inc. v. Gordon, 176 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1965), mentioning that “where one 
method or means of exercising a power is prescribed in a constitution it excludes its exercise in 
other ways.” Id. 
 84. Weinberger, 112 So. at 254. 
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three per cent. of the total amount of the issue.”85  The Court determined that 
the board had issued bonds whose dates of maturity did not fulfill the terms of 
the “express command”86 of the constitution.  Thus, in Weinberger, the 
relevant constitutional clause created a specific legislative power with 
particular conditions under which the power had to be exercised, and the 
legislature instead issued bonds whose nature directly clashed with the 
conditions.  The language that refers to “[a]ny bonds”87 could not be clearer—
all bonds have to conform to those conditions.  In Holmes, however, the State 
exercises a general power over educational matters, and any restrictions on 
that power must be explicitly listed in the state constitution.88  The relevant 
provisions in Holmes contain no prohibitions;89 in fact, they contain no 
language whatsoever that even comes close to Weinberger’s “[a]ny bonds.” 
The gravity of consistently applying in Florida’s future jurisprudence the 
Court’s interpretation of expressio unius from Holmes becomes even clearer if 
one takes an intratextual look at the state constitution.  For instance, Article II, 
Section 7(a) reads as follows: 
It shall be the policy of the state to conserve and protect its natural resources 
and scenic beauty.  Adequate provision shall be made by law for the abatement 
of air and water pollution and of excessive and unnecessary noise and for the 
conservation and protection of natural resources.90 
Adopting the reasoning the Florida Supreme Court employs in Bush v. Holmes 
would entail prohibiting the State from taking any other measures to 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See, e.g., 78 C.J.S. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS § 6 (2005) (footnotes omitted) 
(stating that “[t]he state in legislating concerning education is exercising its broad sovereign 
power, and, subject only to any requirements or restrictions prescribed by the constitution, the 
legislature has a large discretion as to the manner of accomplishing its purpose”).  See also Chiles 
v. Phelps, 714 So. 2d 453, 458 (Fla. 1998) (stating that “[t]he Constitution of this state is not a 
grant of power to the Legislature, but a limitation only upon legislative power, and unless 
legislation be clearly contrary to some express or necessarily implied prohibition found in the 
Constitution, the courts are without authority to declare legislative Acts invalid”). 
 89. The Holmes dissent agrees with this view: 
In Weinberger and the other cases relied upon by the trial court, . . . the expressio unius 
principle found its way into the analysis only because the constitution forbade any action 
other than that specified in the constitution, and the action taken by the Legislature 
defeated the purpose of the constitutional provision. 
  In contrast, in this case, nothing in article IX, section 1 clearly prohibits the 
Legislature from allowing the well-delineated use of public funds for private school 
education, particularly in circumstances where the Legislature finds such use is necessary. 
Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006) (Bell, J., dissenting) (quoting Bush v. Holmes, 767 
So. 2d  668, 674 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)). 
 90. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7(a). 
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“protect . . . scenic beauty.”91  Moving a highway and creating a new park 
would be unconstitutional because that possibility is not amongst the ones 
explicitly listed in the second sentence of Article II, Section 7(a).92  This result 
is blatantly absurd and re-emphasizes that the Weinberger court could not have 
possibly wanted to apply expressio unius as broadly as the Holmes majority 
claims, but rather only would have embraced the idea that where the state 
constitution requires the performance of specific act X, Florida may not 
perform a specific act of non-X. 
The majority makes a number of other arguments against the validity of 
the OSP under the state constitution, but none of them withstand scrutiny.  The 
court claims that “because voucher payments reduce funding for the public 
education system, the OSP by its very nature undermines the system of ‘high 
quality’ free public schools that are the sole authorized means of fulfilling the 
constitutional mandate to provide for the education of all children residing in 
Florida”93 and that “[t]he systematic diversion of public funds to private 
schools on either a small or large scale is incompatible with article IX, section 
1(a).”94  Yet, whether funding school vouchers prevents the State from 
fulfilling its obligation to maintain public schools is not really a constitutional 
question, but rather one of policy.  Legislative bodies must constantly use their 
judgment as to how they should apportion the State budget, and it represents a 
dangerous precedent for the Florida Supreme Court to intervene here.95  As 
Justice Bell points out in his dissent in the case, courts should “declare laws 
unconstitutional only as a matter of imperative and unavoidable necessity.”96  
One wishes the Holmes majority had taken that to heart in this case. 
To conclude the analysis of the Florida Supreme Court’s decision, it is 
instructive to examine a decision that actually provides a concrete instance in 
which a state supreme court correctly interpreted the uniformity clause of the 
state constitution.  The Wisconsin Constitution, paralleling the language of the 
Florida one, mandates: 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. See id. 
 93. Bush, 919 So. 2d at 409. 
 94. Id. 
 95. The court has a role in deciding the question whether the State does fulfill its 
constitutional obligation to provide a “uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of 
free public schools.”  See FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.  If, however, the court holds that the State 
does not meet its mandate, then 1) that constitutes a statement separate from the role of voucher 
programs in leading to the problem (i.e., the cause of a legislative failure in fulfilling 
constitutional tasks is irrelevant), and 2) the question of remedy quite possibly should remain in 
the hands of the legislature.  The legislature could decide to take any number of measures to fix a 
constitutional failure, one of them being to raise taxes to increase funding to public schools rather 
than abolish the voucher program. 
 96. Bush, 919 So. 2d at 413 (Bell, J., dissenting). 
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The legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of district schools, 
which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable; and such schools shall be free 
and without charge for tuition to all children between the ages of 4 and 20 
years; and no sectarian instruction shall be allowed therein . . . .97 
In its landmark decision in Jackson v. Benson,98 the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
held that the state’s uniformity clause did not prohibit the existence of a school 
voucher program that was substantively similar to the Florida OSP.99  After 
clarifying that the acceptance of state monies does not transform private 
schools into public ones (in which case the recipient schools could not be 
sectarian in nature according to the state constitution),100 the court disposed of 
the idea “that the district schools [must] be the only system of state-supported 
education.”101  Following its prior school voucher decision in Davis v. 
Grover,102 the court explicitly concluded that the uniformity clause 
clearly was intended to assure certain minimal educational opportunities for 
the children of Wisconsin.  It does not require the legislature to ensure that all 
of the children in Wisconsin receive a free uniform basic education.  Rather, 
the uniformity clause requires the legislature to provide the opportunity for all 
children in Wisconsin to receive a free uniform basic education.103 
Additionally, unlike the Florida Supreme Court, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
denied that the creation of a school voucher program prevents students from 
attending a uniform system of public schools in any way.104  Had the Florida 
Supreme Court followed similar reasoning, it would not have produced a 
decision that blatantly misunderstands basic principles of statutory 
construction and oversteps the boundaries of the judiciary’s role in policy 
matters.  Accordingly, the state courts that are currently examining local school 
voucher programs will hopefully let precedents such as Wisconsin’s inspire 
their decision-making rather than follow the Florida model. 
While the Institute for Justice and other organizations “are exploring all 
options to save the scholarships of students who rely on them for the only good 
education they have ever known, as well as to protect Florida’s other school 
choice programs for disabled and low-income students,”105 Bush v. Holmes 
struck a hard blow to the voucher movement.  Appealing the case to the United 
 
 97. WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3. 
 98. 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998). 
 99. Id. at 607. 
 100. Id. at 627. 
 101. Id. 
 102. 480 N.W.2d 460 (Wis. 1992). 
 103. Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 628 (quoting Davis, 480 N.W.2d at 474). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Institute for Justice, Holmes v. Bush: Institute for Justice and Parents Defend Florida’s 
Groundbreaking Statewide School Choice Program, http://www.ij.org/schoolchoice/florida/ 
index.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2006). 
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States Supreme Court is close to impossible.  By focusing on the uniformity 
clause alone rather than the no-aid provision, the Florida Supreme Court 
ensured that the case would center on the interpretation of state law alone 
rather than have First Amendment implications.106  It is unclear how much the 
desire to remove any possibility for appeal was itself an important motivating 
factor in the majority’s decision to ignore the Blaine Amendment issue. 
Unfortunately, the Holmes decision also may not remain limited to Florida, 
as other states are currently examining their positions toward school choice.  IJ 
continues to litigate similar issues in several states, and defenders of school 
choice worry about the possibility that courts in these other states could in fact 
use Florida’s Holmes line of decisions to bar the use of vouchers in religious 
schools, which would entail the destruction of those school choice programs 
altogether.107  As one commentator pointed out, “the most effective, definitive, 
and proper way to overcome the unnecessarily broad implications of Florida’s 
Blaine Amendment would be to return to the people to ask them to decide 
whether their State Constitution should be amended to grant the Legislature the 
power it seeks.”108  Not all hope is lost for vouchers in Florida and the 
programs potentially endangered in other states, yet it will take great effort on 
the part of legislators, attorneys, and grassroots organizers to safeguard 
children’s access to better schooling opportunities. 
CONCLUSION 
After a seven-year odyssey through the courts, Florida’s Opportunity 
Scholarship Program has encountered more legal mistakes on the way than its 
defenders probably ever imagined.  What the Florida District Court of Appeal 
should have done was either to strike down the state constitution’s no-aid 
provision for violating the First Amendment of the United States Constitution 
or to hold that the provision does not apply to the OSP.  Instead, in a decision 
riddled with historical and legal errors, the court struck down the OSP itself by 
 
 106. As mentioned, state court judgments are considered final on issues of state law.  See 
supra text accompanying note 18. 
 107. School voucher programs are currently under attack in both Arizona and Maine.  Most 
recently, the federal district court in Arizona upheld the constitutionality of the local school 
voucher program against a claim that the program violated the federal Establishment Clause.  
Winn v. Hibbs, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (D. Ariz. 2005).  In Maine, the Supreme Judicial Court 
upheld the constitutionality of a state statute’s exclusion of religious schools from public funding, 
concluding that the statute violated neither the free exercise of religion nor equal protection under 
the federal Constitution.  Anderson v. Town of Durham, 895 A.2d 944 (Me. 2006).  On July 25, 
2006, the Institute for Justice petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari 
in the Anderson case to overturn the decision.  See Institute for Justice, Parents Ask U.S. Supreme 
Court to End Religious Discrimination & Vindicate Full School Choice, http://www.ij.org/ 
schoolchoice/maine2/7_25_06pr.html. 
 108. Slater, supra note 52, at 619.  The author gives a number of specific suggestions as to 
potential wordings for changes in the relevant legislative text.  Id. at 620–21. 
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holding that it interfered with the state constitution.  The Florida Supreme 
Court’s task was to overturn the District Court of Appeal’s erroneous 
understanding.  Rather than doing so, it employed a distorted view of its 
expressio unius and other jurisprudence to hold that the OSP violated the 
uniformity clause of Florida’s Constitution; the Court never discussed the First 
Amendment issues at all, thus also preventing an appeal to the United States 
Supreme Court.  The question remains open whether Florida’s legislature or 
courts in other states will step in to defend school choice where the Florida 
court system completely failed. 
 
